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DEFENSE -

MALINGER-

The defendant
IN.-[Colorado]
was charged with murder. He had
shot and killed two men without
warning, following a dispute over
some hay on his ranch. He pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity,
but the jury found him guilty of
murder in the first degree and fixed
his penalty at death. During the
trial two physicians testified for the
people that the defendant was sane
at the time of the homicide. The
director of the State Psychopathic
Hospital expressed the opinion that
not only was the defendant sane at
the time of the homicide, but also
that he was sane when examined,
and that he was only malingering.
Defendant was declared sane by
witnesses who had known him for
from seven to thirteen years. The
defendant's witnesses were all members of his family exept one. That
one did not express an opinion as
to the prisoner's sanity, but the
other witnesses testified that his
sister and three of her children
were afflicted with insanity and that
defendant himself was not "right in
his mind." They further testified
that the accused acted insane while
in jail. The testimony of the deputy
sheriff was to the effect that the defendant, while in jail, only acted
insane when he was being watched,
"that he heard the defendant whispering, but not unless others were
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around and the defendant thought
they were looking; that the defendant got so he would not pay any
attention to the witness, but if anybody came in with the witness, the
defendant 'would put on a show' for
them; that isto say, he would throw
all sorts -of things, would grab a
quilt and put it over his head, 'or
something like that.' The witness
also testified that on one occasion,
when some plumbers left late at
night after working at the jail, the
witness turned out the light and
slammed the door and then watched
the defendant through a hole that
the plumbers had made in the wall
in the course of their work; that
the defendant had been dancing
around all afternoon with a quilt
over his shoulders, and had bedding
scattered all around; that after the
witness slammed the door the defendant stood listening and when
he could not hear anything and
thought everybody was gone, his appearance and actions changed; that
he quit 'acting up,' took the quilt
off and laid it on the opposite bunk,
shook the dust out of his bedding,
folded it up, and 'made his bed like
anybody would."' Held: judgment
affirmed, on the theory that the defendant was merely feigning insanity: Farmer v. People (Colorado,
1932), 7 P. (2d) 947.
Simulation of insanity presents
one of the oldest and most important
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extra-legal questions existent in
criminal law. That it is no new
subterfuge is attested by the fact
that over two thousand years ago
Lycophron (285-247 B. C.), a Greek
savant of the time of Ptolemy
Philadelphus, spoke of the feigned
madness of Ulysses, assumed by him
in an effort to avoid military service: Goodwin, "Insanity and the
Criminal," p. 88. There were other
celebrated individuals of ancient
days who also simulated insanity
during times of stress or danger.
King David, Brutus, the expeller of
the Tarquin, and Solon the Athenian may be cited: Jones and Llewellyn, "Malingering," p. 286. Of late
years, following the great development of the insanity defense in
murder trials, the question of
malingering has been squarely presented to American courts. The defense of insanity has proved very
effective in freeing murderers, and
consequently it has been used more
than any other defense. Attorneys
have introduced the plea merely as
legal strategy knowing at the time
that it was not justified and that
there was not the slightest possibility of their clients being mentally
diseased: Current History, August,
1930, p. 943. "The guilty have escaped not only from conviction but
from confinement in humanely managed asylums": Bojes, "The Science
of Penology," p. 214. "Monstrous
verdicts of 'not guilty' have followed
so frequently as at last to arouse
general indignation": Kavanagh,
"The Criminal and His Allies," p.
90.
A short review of a few of the
most celebrated malingering cases
of the last decade or two will tend
to show the extended use made of
feigned insanity in order to procure
the acquittal of guilty defendants.
The case of, George Remus is a re-
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cent example of the modem use of
the insanity defense where malingering was obviously present. Remus
murdered his wife in 'cold-blood,
pleaded insanity, and after a longdrawn out legal battle, during which
he feigned insanity, he was eventually committed to a hospital for the
insane and a short while later set
free: In re Remus (1928) 119 Ohio
St. 166, 162 N. E. 740. The widelyknown case of Russell Scott also
exhibited unmistakeable evidence of
malingering in insanity, but the defendant's own suicide prevented the
success of his plea: People v. Scott
(1927) 326 Ill. 327, 157 N. E. 247.
The case of Harry Thaw, and his
escape from the death penalty on
the grounds of alleged insanity, is
too well known to merit description: Mackenzie, "The Thaw Case',"
p. 299. People v. Thaw (1915)
154 N. Y. S. 949. In addition
a mention may bq made of the
Robin, Graham, and Lincoln cases
in which pleas of feigned insanity
met with varied degrees of success:
Outlook and Independent, February
6, 1929, p. 205. See also: People
v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N. Y. 324,
110 N. E. 945; People v. Krauser
(1925) 315 Ill. 485, 146 N. E. 593;
People v. Costello (1926) 320 Ill.
79, 150 N. E. 712.
In order to prevent such deception various tests have been devised
in an effort to determine the question of alleged mental unsoundness
in criminal cases. Goodwin lists
six such tests in his "Insanity and
the Criminal," p. 95.
(1) What is a possible cause
of the defendant's insanity?
(Heredity, physical injury, worry,
etc.)
(2) The insane exhibit a peculiar eye expression which a malingerer cannot indefinitely simulate. In the presence of the sus-
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pect, imply that he is a malingerer. Then watch to see if his
eye expression betrays an appreciation of the situation.
(3) What is the condition of
the prisoner's memory as to
events unrelated to the crime?
(4) A true lunatic, especially a
maniac, rarely sleeps soundly.
The malingerer, often exhausted
by the effort of malingering, is a
sound sleeper.
(5) An imposter may threaten
suicide. The genuine suicide-tobe rarely proclaims his intention
in advance.
(6) Certain bodily responses
accompany the forms of true inPhysical tests, such as
sanity.
ascertaining blood-pressure, pulse,
condition of the tongue, behavior
of the pupil of the eye, etc., can
be made by medical men as an aid
in discovering a malingerer.
Other suggested tests are:
(7) An insane person will not
admit that he is mad. Does the
suspect vigorously assert his insanity, as is the usual case with
malingerers?: Collie, "Malingering," p. 423.
(8) Letters written by the insane can rarely be imitated. Each
type of insanity produces its special variety of letter. Peruse a
recent letter written by the suspect, or request him to write one:
Ibid, p. 425.
suddenly
malingerer,
(9) A
awakened from sleep, may answer
a question or two intelligently before he realizes his error: (1928)
24 The Medico-Legal Journal, 78.
(10) Insanity often develops so
slowly and insidiously as to be
almost unobserved by relatives
and friends. Does the suspect
acting insane
suddenly begin
after his arrest, seemingly with-

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
out sufficient cause?: Hoag and
Abnormal
Williants, "Crime,
Minds, and the Law," p. 91.
In the instant case it is unfortunate that the court does not discuss the reasons the physicians gave
to support their opinion that the
defendant was sane. By the statement that "there is no necessity for
repeating" the reasons we do not
know whether scientific tests were
used in a solution of this case. Or,
if used, the number and quality of
them is in doubt. The court does
not mention a single test that might
have aided it in affirming the judgment.
A solution of the subject of
malingering has been attempted by
various states. Legislation has been
passed relating to the insanity of
the defendant after his indictment
but before trial. The state most
progressive in this respect is Massachusetts. In 1921 that state passed
a law "making it mandatory to report to the department of mental
diseases for examination any person indicted by a grand jury for a
capital crime or who has previously
been convicted of a felony or known
to have been indicted for any offense more than once. Under this
law the examination is compulsory,
is made by impartial psychiatrists
from the State department of mental diseases as a matter of routine
before trial, or any other action is
taken. Thus an unbiased report by
competent medical experts is secured and made a matter of record
at the very outset of the proceeding. In practice this has resulted
in saving long and costly trials as
the findings have usually been accepted by the prosecuting attorney,
the defendant's counsel and the
court as a satisfactory basis for disposing of a case without trial": The
Survey, May, 1925, pp. 218-219.
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Acts of Mass., 1921, c. 415, as
amended by Acts, 1923, c. 331; Acts,
1925, c. 169; Acts, 1927, c. 59; Acts,
1929, c. 105.
The Massachusetts legislation has
met with marked success and has
been widely approved.
A study
wa made of 113 Massachusetts
cases which arose after the law
was enacted. Of the 113, only 7
"were diagnosed by the psychiatrists
as having 'psychopathic personality' or 'constitutional psychopathic
inferiority.' ".
Previously 'there
had been a feeling that if medicine supplanted the law in this
field, there would be a tendency
to find all criminals irresponsible
even in borderline cases.
This
study definitely expelled such a feeling: McCarty "Mental Defectives
and the Criminal Law" (1929) 14
Iowa Law Rev. 401.
Colorado has 'passed legislation
which is second only in importance
to that enacted by Massachusetts:
Session Laws of Colorado, 1927, c.
90. This legislation also attempts
to place the insanity question in the
hands of impartial scientists, but it
approaches the problem in a different manner from that of Massachusetts. In Colorado, if the plea
of insanity is raised, the defendant
is committed to a State hospital for
observation as was done in the case
at point. A commission of one or
more physicians, specialists in mental diseases, may also be appointed
to examine the prisoner. This latter provision is not mandatory in
the Colorado statute but is left in
the hands of the trial judge, a nonmedical person who must take the
initiative. There is no evidence in
the instant case that the judge in
the exercise of his sound discretion
appointed such a commission under
his statutory power.
The only
proof that defendant was a malin-
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gerer was given in the usual way by
testimony on behalf of the state.
There was no report by an unbiased
medical commission.
The result
reached was undoubtedly sound, but
it clearly reveals the weakness of
the Colorado statute in contrast to
the Massachusetts one in not requiring a compulsory and impartial
examination of a defendant pleading insanity instead of only a compulsory commitment to a State hospital. The requirement of compulsory examination as well as commitment as practiced in Massachusetts adequately illustrates the superiority of the Massachusetts statute as a model statute. See as to
other state statutes on the subject:
Glueck "Mental Disorder and the
Criminal Law," p. 53 ff. and pp.
499-643.
Another solution of the problem
was attempted when former Chief
Justice Harry Olson of the Municipal Court of Chicago established a
psychiatric laboratory designed to
operate in connection with his court.
He was one of the first to stress
the practical importance of a better
medical knowledge of prisoners. A
few other laboratories were also
established at the criminal courts,
and they showed inherent merit.
During the first ten years examinations and tests were made of over
40,000 cases in the criminal courts:
14 Iowa Law Rev. 408.
JOHN KNOX.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATIONSUFFICIENCY [Oklahoma]. The de-

fendant was charged by information
with the crime of larceny of "domestic fowls," no designation being made as to the kind of fowl.
The statute under which the defendant was charged makes it a
felony to steal "domestic fowls," but
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does not provide that any further
designation be made as to the kind
of fowl stolen: Okla. Comp. St.
1921 Sec. 2119. A demurrer was
filed to the information and it was
overruled. The defendant excepted,
and on appeal the case was reversed
and remanded with directions to
sustain the demurrer for the reasons that the information did not
state sufficient facts to advise the
accused of the charge against him,
and that it could not be ascertained
from the allegations what class of
domestic fowl or fowls the state
was seeking to convict him of stealing: Hemphill v. State (Okla. Cr.
App. 1931) 6 Pac. (2nd) 450.
It has been held that where there
is a statute concerning the particular offense, it is sufficient and even
advisable to describe the stolen
property in the words of the statute:
Sloan v. State (1873) 42 Ind. 570;
Long v. State (1888) 23 Neb. 33;
State v. Wilson (1912) 63 Ore. 344,
127 Pac. 980. But it has been said
that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law
or by statute, includes generic terms,
it is not sufficient that the indictment charge the offense in the same
generic terms as in the definition,
but it must state the species and the
particulars: United States v. Cruishank (1875) 92 U. S. 542; Coinmnonwealth v. Chase (1878)
125
Mass. 202. This view seems to be
generally followed by the courts in
this country and apparently was
favored in the instant case. Particularity and certainty in indictments and informations have been
stressed by the courts in their overanxiety to protect the accused's
rights so that he'may be given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense: United States v.
Hess (1887) 124 U. S. 483, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 571; People v. Bricker
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(1920) 212 Mich. 137, 180 N. W.
383.
It may be observed that a few
courts have not chosen to follow
this seemingly well-established rule,
and have held, particularly in cattle-stealing %cases, that a general
description in generic terms of the
property stolen is sufficient: People
v. Littlefield (1855) 5 Cal. 355;
State v. Dewitt (1899) 152 Mo. 84,
53 S. W. 429; Matthews v. State
(1899) 41 Tex. Cr. Rep. 98, 51 S.
W. 915; State ex rel. Esser v. District Court (1918) 42 Nev. 218, 174
Pac. 1023; Perkins v. State (1931)
182 Ark. 1167, 34 S. W. (2d) 746.
Under this view it seems that the
instant case could have been decided
differently with but little pressure
on the conscience of the court. The
Oklahoma statute reads as follows:
"The indictment or information
must contain a statement of the
acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, and
in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended": Okla.
Comp. St. 1921 Sec. 2556. The
court applied this statute in arriving at its decision. May it not
rationally be said that the accused
was sufficiently informed of the offense with which he was charged?
It would seem that the crime was
so described as to be readily understood by "a person of common understanding." Is not the court backing away from its chief function
of seeing that justice is done by
finding that an indictment, which is
set forth in generic terms and follows the words of the statute, is insufficient merely because it does not
state particulars? The court could
have adopted a less technical view
and arrived at a more just and rational result. Courts recently have
been favoring a more liberal inter-
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pretation of indictments which are
framed in the words of the statute;
and apparently the tendency is away
from the holding of the principal
case.
EDWARD S. ALTERSOHN.

MANSLAUGHTER-

ACCESSORY BE-

FORE THE FAcr.-[Kentucky] Defendant was indicted for having
aided and abetted in the killing of
deceased, Sam Wright. The defendant, his wife, and Melvin Branham,
the deceased principal in the crime,
were members of a family divided
into two quarreling factions. The
above named persons composed one
faction, and Sam Wright, his wife,
Mahala Wright, and Henry Branham composed the other. The wife
of the defendant went on the premises of the Wrights in search of
her dog. When she found it, she
commenced to whip it; her aunt
Mahala Wright then interfered and
the two women started to fight. Defendant being informed of this fight
rushed to the scene followed by
Melvin Branham who had a gun.
They were stopped outside the
premises by Sam Wright, the deceased, at the point of a gun. Defendant shouted to Melvin Bran,
ham, "Shoot him! God damn him!
Shoot him !" Melvin Branham shot
and killed Sam Wright, and the defendant, was tried and convicted of
being an accessory to the crime of
manslaughter.
Held, on appeal:
judgment reversed on the ground
that the lower court should have
granted the defendant's motion and
excluded the witnesses from the
court room before the state opened
its case to the jury. The decision
however laid down the rule that the
mere presence of the defendant,
without more, at the time decedent
was killed by another would not
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make the defendant criminally liable
for homicide: Ray v. Commonwealth (1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 694.
This rule is supported by the
great weight of authority both in
this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions: White v. People (1876) 81
Ill. 333; People v. Fay (1888) 70
Mich. 421, 38 N. W. 296; McCoy v.
State (1898) 40 FIa. 494, 24 So.
485; Walker v. State (1903) 118
Ga. 10, 43 S. E. 856; Tucker v.
Commonwealth (1911) 145 Ky. 84,
140 S. W. 73. The presence of the
defendant at the scene of the homicide is, however, one of the evidentiary circumstances for the consideration of the jury: Burrell v.
State (1857) 18 Tex. 713; State v.
Maloy (1876) 44 Iowa 104; Burnham v. State (1911) 61 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 616, 135 S. W. 1175; People
v. Cione (1920) 293 Ill. 321, 127
N. E. 646.
In order that a defendant be
guilty as an accessory before the
fact to a homicide, he must have
aided, abetted, assisted, or advised
its commission, or must have been
present with that purpose in mind,
to the knowledge of the party actually committing the crime: Horton
v. Commonwealth (1901) 99 Va.
848, 38 S. E. 184; People v. Mills
(1903) 41 Misc. Rep. 195, 83 N. Y.
Sup. 947; State v. Bailey (1908) 63
W. Va. 668, 60 S. E. 785. See:
Commonwealth v. Kern (1867) 1
Brewst. (Pa.) 350; Bast v. Commonwealth (1907) 124 Ky. 747, 99 S.
W. 978; Way v. State (1908) 155
Ala. 52, 46 So. 273. Therefore, if
the defendant was present at the
time and place of the crime and
merely acquiesced in its commission without previous knowledge
that the crime was going to be committed, he Zannot be held as an accessory before the fact. So in the
case of Omer v. Commonwealth
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(1894) 95 Ky. 253, 25 S. W. 594,
the court condemned an instruction
by which the jury were in effect told
that, if Oliver was fired upon and
killed by someone other than Omer,
with Omer's knowledge or consent,
the defendant was guilty because
that instruction did not require it to
be Omer's previous knowledge or
consent. Of course Omer knew at
the time the Tring was going on
that it was being done, and the instruction was erroneous because it
did not limit this to previous
knowledge of Omer.
However, acquiescence without
previous knowledge does not in all
cases render the accused immune
from being an accessory before the
fact. Thus, where this acquiescence
amounts to a negligent omission of
a legal duty, whereby death ensues,
there may be an indictment for murder or manslaughter: People v.
Diamond (1902) 72 N. Y. App. Div.
281, 76 N. Y. S. 57, 175 N. Y. 517,
67 N. E. 1087; Adams v. Commonwealth (1908) 129 Ky. 420; Powell
v. U. S. (1924) 2 Fed. (2d) 47;
Bishop, "Criminal Law" (8th ed.
1913) vol. I, sec. 314. But it is
emphatically asserted in these cases
that such legal duty must exist. A
casual spectator who fails to interfere in the commission of a crime
would not thereby render himself a
party to that crime: Jones v. People
(1897) 166 Ill. 264, 46 N. E. 723.
On the other hand a conductor of
a train on which fifty gallons of
whiskey were transported in such
shape that he could not but have
known of its presence was convicted for knowingly transporting
liquor.
The court said accused
should have seen, as jar as was
reasonably within his power that
the law was observed on his train:
Powell v. U. S., supra.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
The meaning of the terms "aid"
and "abet" has become somewhat
confused in a maze of definitions:
Baumgarter v. State (1919) 20
Ariz. 157, 178 Pac. 30, 32; People
v. Barnes (1924) 311 Ill.
559, 143
N. E. 445, 447; Johnson v. State
(1926) 21 Ala. App. 565, 110 So.
55; State v. Baldwin (1927) 193 N.
C. 566, 137 S. E. 590, 591. It wohld
seem however that the surrounding
circumstances of each case, determine whether or not the specific
acts or words constitute aiding and
abetting. Mere words alone, as in
the principal case, which incite and
encourago the commission of the
crime have been held to be sufficient
to make one an accessory before the
fact: Rasberry v. State (1917) 80
Tex. Crim. App. 498, 191 S. W. 356.
Or the defendant, though not actually doing the felonious act, by his
will contributing to, or procuring
it to be done: True v. Commonwealth (1890) 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W.
684. Or the defendant sharing the
criminal intent of the party committing the crime: Triple H. v.
Commonwealth (1925) 141 Va. 577,
127 S. E. 486.
In the principal case, defendant
was not only present, but by his
words incited the commission of the
crime. This was determined by the
verdict in the lower court which is
supported by a preponderance of
authority: Rasberry v. State, supra;
Wynn v. State (1885) 63 Miss. 260;
Creech v. Commonwealth (1908)
32 Ky. L. Rep. 808, 107 S. W. 212;
Rose v. State (1916) 79 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 413, 186 S. W. 202. That
judgment on this verdict was reversed in the instant case, because
the witnesses were not excluded
from the court before the state
opened its case to the jury, a matter which was entirely discretionary

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
with that court seems to have been
a miscarriage of justice.
ALVIN R. KATZ.

- DECLARATION
JuRoR ACQUAINTED
ASSISTANT STATE'S

FORMER JEOPARDY
OF MISTRIAL WITH FORMER

On a trial
ATToRNFY -[Illinois]
for conspiracy to suborn perjury, a
juror was asked whether he knew
anyone in the State's attorney's office. He mentioned a former assistant State's attorney, who entered the court-room shortly afterwards and spoke to one of the defendants, while waving with his
hand to this juror. After the defense counsel had said that he had
no objection, the court withdrew a
juror and declared a mistrial. On
writ of error to review the conviction at the ensuing trial, counsel for
the plaintiff-in-error contended that
the defendant did not consent to
the withdrawal of the juror. Held:
that the judgment should be affirmed on the ground that there
was no error in the record requiring a reversal; that the withdrawal
of the juror presented a case of
absolute necessity in which the discretion of the trial judge was controlling: People v. Sinws (Ill. 1931)
178 N. E. 188.
The decision is in accord with
the general principle that the court
may discharge a jury without working an "acquittal" of the defendant
in any case where the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated,
although it is usually held that a
plea of former jeopardy will prevail unless there is an absolute
necessity for the discharge to prevent a miscarriage of justice: State
v. Thompson (1921) 58 Utah 291,
199 Pac. 161, note, 38 A. L. R. 697
(bystander commented to juror that
"such a prosecution is a shame";
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not such an absolute necessity as to
defeat the plea of former jeopardy); State v. Slorah (1919) 118
Me.203, 106 Atl. 768, note, 4 A. L.
R. 1256 (defendant exclaimed, on a
view with the jury, "take me away
before I go insane again"; jury's
discharge was an absolute necessity) ; Armor v. State (1906) 125
Ga. 3, 53 S. E. 815 (juror was
prosecutor's relative; absolute necessity); Simmons v. U. S. (1891)
142 U. S. 148, 12 Sup. Ct. 171 (jury
discharged because of juror's acquaintance with the defendant);
People v. Diamond (1925) 231
Mich. 484, 204 N. W. 105 (juror
asked the defendant's daughter at
lunch whether they had a case);
State v. Bell (1879) 81 N. C. 591
(juror had helped the defendant
prepare his case); State v. Sueing
(1873) 42 Ind. 541 (giving jury a
can of beer did not necessitate their
discharge). Service of petit juror
on the grand jury which returned
the indictment may be an "absolute
necessity": People v. Peplos (1930)
340 IIl. 27, 172 N. E. 54; Martin
v. State (1923) 161 Ark. 423, 256
S. W. 367; Stewart v. State (1864)
15 Ohio St. 155; contra: O'Brian v.
Commonwealth (1872) 72 Ky. 333;
and see, Riley v. Commoinwealth
(1921) 190 Ky. 204, 227 S. W. 146.
The Illinois provision against
double jeopardy is: "No person
shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense": Constitution of 1870, Art. II, sec. 10.
This defense may be shown under
the plea of not guilty: People v.
Peplos, supra; Hankins v. People
106 Ill.628; People v.
(1883)
Hawkinson (1927) 324 Ill. 285, 155
N. E. 318; People v. Brady (1916)
272 Ill. 401, 112 N. E. 126. It is
usually considered that jeopardy
attaches when the jury is sworn:
Green v. State (1923) 147 Tenn.
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299, 247 S. W. 84; O'Donnell v.
People (1906) 224 Ill. 218, 79 N.
E. 639 (jeopardy does not attach
when only four jurors are sworn);
McFadden v. Commonwealth (1854)
23 Pa. 12 (same for eleven) ; Lovato
v. N. M. (1916) 242 U. S. 199, 37
Sup. Ct. 107 (jeopardy does not
attach until the defendant pleads);
Huey v. State (1920) 88 Tex. Cr.
377, 227 S. W. 186; note, 12 A. L.
R. 1006.
Cases where the doctrine of absolute necessity has been recognized
are those in which the defendant
consents: Riley v. Commonwealth,
supra; Martin v. State (1924) 163
Ark. 103, 259 S. W. 6, note 33 A.
L. R. 133 (the defendant's consent
was unnecessary when a juror had
served on former trial of same
case); Hilands -v. Commonwealth
(1885) 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl. 70 (defense of former jeopardy %,,as not
waived by the defendant's consent
to the jury's separation); Cornero
v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th 1931) 48 F.
(2d) 69 (discharge of jury over
the defendant's objection sustains
plea of former jeopardy) ; either
the judge, a juror or the defendant
is sick or absent from court: People
ex rel. Brinkman v. Barr (1928) 248
N. Y. 126, 161 N. E. 444 (judge
sick) ; Salistean v. State (1927) 115
Neb. 838, 215 N. W. 107 (member
of juror'9 family was sick; former
jeopardy was no defense) ; State v.
Slorah, supra.
If the jury is unable to agree
after deliberating for a reasonable
time, their discharge may not
amount to an acquittal of the defendant: U. S. v. Perez (1824) 22
U. S. 579; State v. Barnes (1909)
54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792 (fortythree hours); Dreyer v. People
(1900) 188 Ill. 40, 58 N. E. 620
(sixteen hours); contra: Bellis v.
State (1928) 157 Tenn. 177, 7 S.

W. (2d) 46 (sixteen hours) ; People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden (1911)
202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 279 (five
hours).
A jury was discharged
after deliberating for five hours
because the term of court had
ended; a conviction of the defendant at a subsequent trial was affirmed: Winsor v. The Queen
(1866) L. R. 1 Q. B. 289.
The majority of states have some
provision in regard to double jeopardy, usually contained in the constitution. As has been seen, some
confusion has arisen as to just
when jeopardy attaches. This applies, also, to the "same offense"
concept, which has been accelerated
to a certain extent by the litigation under the Federal and State
liquor legislation. In Ohio, a conviction for transporting liquor in
one county allows a plea of former
jeopardy to a prosecution in another
county for the same transaction as
it is a continuing offense: State v.
Shiminan (1930) 122 Ohio St. 522,
172 N. E. 367. But a person can
be punished for the same crime in
both Federal and State courts as
these are violations of two laws:
U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U. S.
542; U. S. v. Lanza (1922) 260 U.
S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 141. The same
situation is applicable to violations
of State laws and municipal ordinances: State v. Cavett (1927)
172 Minn. 16, 214 N. W. 479.
An acquittal of larceny obtained
by false testimony does not allow
recognition of the defense of former
jeopardy in a prosecution for
perjury: People v. Niles (1921)
300 Ill. 458, 133 N. E. 252, note
37 A. L. R. 1284; People v. Melnich (1916) 274 Ill. 616, 113 N. E.
971; People v. Ashbrook (1917)
276 Ill. 382, 114 N. E. 922; State
v. Cary (1902) 159 Ind. 504, 65 N.
E. 527; Teague v. Commonwealth
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(1916) 172 Ky. 665, 189 S. W. 908.
An acquittal of larceny does not
bar a prosecution for burglary
based on the same transaction:
Cambron v. State (1922) 191 Ind.
431, 133 N. E. 498, note 19 A. L.
R. 623; Gordon v. State (1882) 71
Ala. 315; People v. Devlin (1904)
143 Cal. 128, 76 Pac. 90,0; State v.
Hooker (1907) 145 N. C. 581, 59
S. E. 866. But where the verdict
on an information charging a
burglarious entry, was guilty of
larceny, there could be no further
prosecution for larceny or burglary:
State v. Burnes (1915) 263 Mo.
593, 173 S. W. 1070. Where one
indictment charged murder by shooting and the second one, murder by
striking with a gun there was no
double jeopardy as the offenses
charged are not the same: Guedel
v. People (1867) 43 Ill. 227. Two
injuries inflicted in the same
transaction are sometimes considered two different offenses: State
v. Labbee (1925) 134 Wash. 55,
234 Pac. 1049; People v. Majors
(1884) 65 Cal. 138, 2 Pac. 744.
The opposing view that a prosecution for one bars a prosecution for
the other has been maintained in
several cases, however: Gunter v.
State (1895) 111 Ala. 23, 20 Sou.
632; Clen v. State (1873) 42 Ind.
420; State v. Nelson (1849) 29 Me.
329; Griffith v. State (1915) 93
Ohio St. 294, 112 N. E. 1017; State
v. Cooper (1833) 13 N. J. L. 361
(conviction of arson barred prosecution for murder); Smith v. State
(1929) 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W. (2d)
400 (conviction of manslaughter
barred prosecution for assault and
battery but not for driving an automobile while intoxicated) ; see
Wright v. State (1897) 37 Tex. Cr.
627, 40 S. W. 491 (acquittal of one
crime does not bar prosecution for
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another although a conviction
might).
Into this array of decisions comes
the American Law Institute's proposed restatement relating to double
jeopardy. It states ihat at common
law the doctrine was that an accused
person had not been in jeopardy
until the jury had rendered a veidict of either guilty or not guilty on
the crime in question. A jury's discharge prior to such action was no
bar to a subsequent prosecution.
The basis for this view goes back to
a statement by Lord Coke in which
he says that after a jury has been
impaneled it 'should not be discharged until a verdict is rendered:
Co. Litt. 227 b; Coke: Third Institute 110; Hale P. C. 267. To
argue the other way, a passage from
the Doctor and Student, Dial. 2, cap.
52 and Hale P. C. 244 may be cited:
Reg. v. Charieswortl (Q. B. 1861)
1 B. & S. 460, 10I E. C. L. 459;
contra: Reg. v. W'Vardle (1842) Car.
& M. 647.
The problem of the "same offense" is attacked in the American
Law Institute's work by the test of
the violation of the criminal law
in connection with the similarity of
the fact situation. It states that a
jury may be discharged only when
it is impossible to proceed without
injustice. The provision that a
conviction unreversed or an acquittal in one state bars a prosecution for the violation of the same
part of the criminal law in anotherstate or under the flaws of the
United States is, perhaps, more salutary than the decisions cited supra.
Other clauses contain the following
stipulations: where acquittals are
obtained by technicalities such as
errors in the indictment there may
be a subsequent prosecution; a state
is entitled to a new trial if the defendant has been acquitted and there
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is a material error which would
prejudice the state; when an acquittal or conviction of a person
is obtained by some fraud or collusion on his part, it shall be no
bar to another prosecution for the
same offense; a verdict which is so
imperfect as to render judgment
on it impossible does not bar another trial; if a new trial is
awarded, this does not constitute a
second prosecution for the same
offense; all pleas of double jeopardy, such as former acquittal, or
conviction are abolished and the
defenses are allowed to be shown
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under a motion to quash the indictment or information.
The preliminary draft of the
American Law Institute on this subject should do much to relieve the
confusion which, at present, surrounds the problem. That such revision was required, may be readily
perceived by no more than a superficial survey of the cases such as
has been attempted here. If the
provisions are given proper recognition, they should tend to eliminate
some of the difficulty which is associated with the idea of double
jeopardy, now.
J. F. WATERMAN.

